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IS COMPETITION LAW THE ANALGESIC
FOR THE INDIAN HEALTHCARE SECTOR?
-Murali

Neelakantan1

Healthcare seems to be in the news in every country, irrespective of whether
it is a developed, developing or least developed nation. Even in countries in
Western Europe, where the government provides free healthcare, there seems to
be no end to the dissatisfaction of all stakeholders. Healthcare reforms seem to
always be near the top of the agenda for Presidential candidates in the USA. It
seems that India has caught the global bug with the Government announcing a
National Health Policy.3
Civil servants, public sector employees, armed forces and other para military
services, railways and some factory workers who are covered by the Employee
State Insurance Scheme have access to free healthcare, in a manner similar to
that enjoyed in the USA or the European Union (EU). A vast majority of healthcare cost in India is self-funded by patients and their families4 and it is they who
suffer the most in the Indian healthcare system. The private sector today provides
nearly 80% of outpatient care and about 60% of inpatient care, accounting for
70% of the total healthcare expenditure.5 This paper explores some of the symptoms and suggests a few changes to address the causes that arise from the manner in which Indian intellectual property rights laws operate in this sector.
I. HOW DOES OUR HEALTHCARE
SYSTEM HURT PATIENTS?
Due to the complex nature of our healthcare system, there is very little
focus on patients for whom the most important issues are access to medicines
2

3
4

5

Founder, Amicus and former Global General Counsel, Cipla Limited.
See for example, the response by the staff of the National Health Service in the UK to comments
by the Secretary for Health, Jeremy Hunt.
Available in draft form at: http://mohfw.nic.in/showfile.php?lid=3014.
Data for the period 1995 - 2013, available with the World Health Organisation indicates that
between 86% and 92% of private healthcare is self-funded and government expenditure is
between 22% and 32% of total healthcare expenditure, available at http://apps.who.int/nha/
database/ViewData/Indicators/en.
Draft National Health Policy, 2015, at 10.
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and healthcare infrastructure. This is not merely a concern about cost of drugs.
Indians have perhaps the most choice in terms of the range of medicines and
more and more drugs are being introduced almost at the same time as the rest of
the world. 6 With India widely acknowledged as the pharmacy of the world, every
generic drug has several substitutes, available at different price points, a sure sign
of a vibrant competitive market, which is being slowly killed by irrational price
controls. 7 For example, there are over 600 brands of paracetamol manufactured
by over 300 entities but do patients really have a choice? How does law affect
access to medicines and how can competition law address this? If there is just
one product, i.e., a monopoly, and that limits choice, is there a proper mechanism
and framework to ensure access for all to this product? Much has been written
about the nexus between doctors and pharma companies. Are the ethical guidelines for doctors sufficient to address this issue? The government established and
continues to use scarce healthcare budget to fund loss-making public sector pharmaceutical undertakings8 which do not seem to contribute to the healthcare needs
of the nation while seeking private enterprises to tender for affordable generic
drugs under the Jan Aushadhi Scheme.
There hasn't been sufficient research published about the effect of Intellectual
Property Rights (IPR) on the Indian healthcare sector 9 or the impact of competition law on its structure'. The only references to competition law in the context of healthcare occur in the decisions of the Competition Commission of India
(CCI) in the series of AJOCD cases", the Sun Pharma - Ranbaxy merger 2 and
the Hiranandani3 case but very little is discussed in these decisions about the
6

The recent case of Sofosbuvir, the only known cure for Hepatitis C being introduced in India
within a year of it being available in the USA is a good example.

7

See The IMS Institute India, Assessing the Impact of Price Control Measures on Access to

Medicines in India (2015) for an evaluation of price controls and how it has failed to increase
access but has adversely affected the health of the Indian pharma industry.
A recent example is of Hindustan Lifecare Limited, formerly Hindustan Latex Limited, a company owned by the government of India and one of the largest global manufacturers of condoms which exports at a price that is below cost, while there is a scarcity of condoms in India to
address the HIV AIDS crisis here.
Bishwanath Goldar et al, Effects of New Patents Regime on Consumers and Producers of Drugs/

Medicines in India, Revised Report Submitted to the UNCTAD (August 2010), after reviewing
extensive data of generic drugs, concludes, with very little basis, that a monopolistic patent is
unlikely to cause price distortion.
See for example, Aditya Bhattacharjea and Fiyanshu Sindhwani, Competition Issues in the Indian
Pharmaceuticals Sector, available at http://www.cuts-ccier.org/compeg/pdf/report-pharmaceu-

tical sector study.pdf. This study does not address the monopolistic impact of patents and the
extension of the patent by trade mark and trade dress.
See Santuka Associates (P) Ltd v. All India Organization of Chemists and Druggists

Assn.AIOCD,

2013

SCC

OrderOfCommission/202011.pdf,
12

13

OnLine

CCI

16

at

http://www.cci.gov.in/May20ll/

Peeveear v. All India Organization of Chemists and Druggists

Assn, Case No. 30 of 2011 and Sandhya DrugAgency, In re, 2013 SCC OnLine CCI 84.
Combination Registration No. C-2014/05/170 (December 05, 2014), at 14, available at http://www.
cci.gov.in/May20ll/OrderOfCommission/CombinationOrders/C-2014-05 -170.pdf.
Ramakant Kini, In re, 2014 SCC OnLine CCI 15 :2014 CompLR 263 (CCI). ("Hiranandani").
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healthcare market or indeed intellectual property rights 4 . As a result, there has
been very little jurisprudence about the definition of a relevant market for the
healthcare sector and nothing on the effect of IPR and its interplay with competition law 5 .
II. WHY COMPETITION LAW IS UNIQUELY
PLACED TO REMEDY THE SITUATION
The common principle with the law is that whatever is permitted to be done
by one legislation is usually exempt from being affected by another legislation so that both laws can operate in a harmonious manner is their own exclusive spheres. However, competition law is an exception to this principle and it is
explicitly stated that it has an overriding effect over all other laws 16.There have
been extremely interesting examples of both the EU' 7 and the US 8 sanctioning
companies who, while doing what was permitted by specific law, were held to be
in violation of competition law. This allows competition law to have a wider role
in the regulation of the market and its stakeholders.
The only case of the interplay between IPR and competition law 9 is currently
in suspended animation. Since IPR essentially creates a monopoly, which is an
anathema to a market, the ability of competition law to be able to moderate its
effects is critical to the growth of the economy. While there are some provisions
in the Patents Act 20 , Trade Marks Act 2' and Copyright Act22 , to prevent the abuse
of the monopoly granted by these legislation, competition law plays a significant
role in filling the gaps. A good example of this is the abuse of the dominance
by Actavis: "If we do the hard switch and we convert the patients and caregivers to once-a-day therapy versus twice a day, it's very difficult for the generics

14

16

There is a passing mention in the Sun - Ranbaxy order of the relevant market for generics being
the molecule without any useful analysis or explanation.
The decision in Micromax Informatics Limited, In re, 2013 SCC OnLine CCI 78 (Competition
Commission of India, November 11, 2013) is still a few years away. The issue is the refusal by
Ericsson to licence standard essential patents for GSM technology to Micromax for it to use
in mobile phone handsets. The CCI directed the Director General to commence investigation.
Ericsson appealed this CCI order and the Delhi High Court granted an interim injunction against
the investigation.
See Section 60, Competition Act, 2002.
Case T-321/05 Astra IZeneca v. Commission, 2010 ECR 11-2805: MEMO/10/294. Significant fines
under competition law for abuse of the patent perhaps provided a more effective remedy than
revoking the patent under the Patents Act which may well have been at the end of its term.
State of New York v. Actavis Pc and Forest Laboratories LLC, SDNY 14-cv-4624 (2nd Cir

2015). Here the court granted an injunction against switching patients from a drug which was at
the end of its patent term to an 'extended release' version to prevent competition from generics.
19 Micromax Informatics Limited, In re, supra note 15.
20
21
22

Section 85, Patents Act, 1970.
Section 47, Trade Marks Act, 1999.
Section 31, Copyright Act, 1957.
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then to reverse-commute back."23 The judge relied on this statement to establish
intent and stated that while the mere possession of monopoly power is not unlawful, monopolists cannot run their businesses in an anti-competitive manner. The
purpose of the hard switch was anticompetitive: to put barriers and obstacles
24
in the path of producers of generic memantine and thereby protect Namenda's
revenues from a precipitous decline following generic entry. 25 So long as there
is a clear framework to identify the relevant market and how it is being abused
by rights holders, competition law is uniquely placed to address abuse of rights
granted by other laws.
III. LACK OF FOCUS ON THE DEFINITION
OF THE RELEVANT MARKET
The first pain point while attempting to apply competition law is an understanding of a relevant market and some parameters for us to be able to determine
it in each case. Would each of the following be a relevant market since the consumers, suppliers, pricing and procurement process is unique?
1. Central Government Health Service, where civil servants are able to use
both public and private infrastructure for healthcare services with the government bearing the costs;
2. Employee State Insurance Scheme where employees of both public and
private sector are given free access to healthcare;
3. Retired and serving armed services personnel and their families are provided free healthcare services for life;
4. Hospitals which are "empanelled" by insurers who pay the insured's costs
and others which are not and require the patient to pay for services;
5. The Jan Aushadhi Scheme of the government providing low cost generic
medicines; and
6. All those of us who cannot be part of any of the above.
23

24

State of New York v. Actavis Plc and Forest Laboratories LLC, SDNY 14-cv-4624 (2nd Cir

2015).

Alzheimer's disease is currently treated by five drugs; all the drugs except Namenda are acetylcholinesterase inhibitors (CI) and work in the same basic manner. Namenda is the brand name

for memantine, an N-Methyl D-Aspartate (NMDA) receptor antagonist and works differently
from CIs. The CEO of Actavis made a public statement to analysts that the core of the brand
strategy with the new extended release (XR) version was to convert the existing business to
Namenda XR as fast as possible to protect Namenda revenue from generic penetration in 2015
when patent exclusivity expires.
25 There seems to be a clear acknowledgement of the monopoly of Namenda. See Stuart Silverman,
Second Circuit Affirms Preliminary Injunction in Antitrust Suit Against Drug Companies for
Product Hopping, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY WCL NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (May 22, 2015), available

at http://news.monster.com/a/business/second-circuit-affirms-preliminary-injunction-in-antitrustsuit-against-drug-companies-for-pr-ffge0f.
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If these questions had been asked in the AIOCD cases, we would have had a
better sense of why the CCI considered a distribution and sale of medicines in a
state as the relevant market. Perhaps the CCI concluded that the relevant market
was 'All of us who are not any of the above' without explaining itself since it was
of the view that the AIOCD was really a cartel and its members were critical to
all the drugs getting to those of us who did not have access to free healthcare
provided by the government. A possible explanation for why this analysis was not
considered relevant may be because this was not seen in the US and European
competition law cases which one reads. One would expect that someone, somewhere, would ask why this issue has never been raised in all those cases and it
may then occur to them, that the healthcare systems there are so very different
from ours that they have other pains, not this one.
All that we can gather from the decisions of the CCI until now is that (i) in
the case of generic drug companies, a single molecule can be the relevant market 26; (ii) a single hospital can be dominant in the relevant market 27; and (iii)
stockists, distributors and retailers of drugs form a relevant market. 28 All of
this may well be correct but does it further the nascent competition law jurisprudence, guiding us in organising our affairs so that we can comply with the
law? So, while concluding that a molecule is the relevant market 29, it would have
helped if we could be provided an explanation for why a therapy area like oncology is not the relevant market30 or why the ATC3 classification is not appropriate. 3' After all, when an enterprise has a strong oncology portfolio with many
competitors, each having a few drugs to treat that therapy, one should look at the
32
therapy as a relevant market, as the European Union did in the case of Novartis.
To be able to evaluate this possibility, one would need to understand how global
pharmaceutical companies have evolved and where they are headed. This would
26

27

28
29

CCI Order in the matter of the combination of Sun and Ranbaxy, Combination Registration
No. C-2014/05/170 (December 5, 2014), at 14, available at http://www.cci.gov.in/May20ll/
OrderOfCommission/CombinationOrders/C-2014-05-170.pdf.
Hiranandani,supra note 13. Would every pharmacy in a hospital be a dominant undertaking
since patients have little or no choice but to buy from such in-house pharmacies? Will the hospital and the pharmacy be tested for abuse of dominance? Will such pharmacies be forced to stock
all competing products? Or will the CCI fall back on the Coca Cola case (Consumer Guidance
Society, In re, 2012 SCC OnLine Comp AT 175) and hold that the relevant market for drugs is
India and hospitals and in-house pharmacies are not dominant?
AIOCD cases, supra note 11.
There have been examples where one drug, Namenda, has been treated as dominant in a market
and it is possible that one molecule can constitute a market. See State of New York v. Actavis Plc
and Forest LaboratoriesLLC, SDNY 14-cv-4624 (2nd Cir 2015).

30

31

32

Bhattacharjea and Sindhwani, supra note 10. They conclude that the Indian pharma market is
really to be viewed as distinct therapy areas where a few companies dominate each therapy.
See, for example, ATC-3 therapeutic classification like antiepileptics in Case No COMP/M.4402UCB/Schwarz Pharma, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/
m4402 20061121 20310 en.pdf.
See (Case No. COMP/M.7275- Novartis/GlaxoSmithKline Oncology Business, available at http:/
ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7275 20150128 20212 4158734 EN.pdf.
Here, treatment of ovarian cancer was held to be a relevant market.

NATIONAL LAW SCHOOL OF INDIA REVIEW

27 NLSI REv. (2015)

have been obvious if one notices the trend towards consolidation and domination
of therapy areas33 rather than one-on-one competition by molecule. If each therapy area, cholesterol controlling drugs, for example, is the relevant market and
the market share and competitor data for all the 'statins' is aggregated, would the
conclusion in the Sun - Ranbaxy case have been different?
The failure to understand and explain the decision on how the CCI determines
'relevant market' has a significant impact on how competition law is applied and
how effective it is. If each molecule is a relevant market, would every patented
drug be a relevant market in itself and therefore be a monopoly, or will the CCI,
in a case of patented drugs, accept therapy area as the relevant market and allow
for competition between patented drugs amongst themselves and older generics
of the same class that are used to treat the same indications? The same molecule
in different forms (intravenous and intraocular, for example), for different uses
and with significant price differential (upto 100 fold) may well constitute different
markets.34
The best example of this in the Indian context is Aspirin. Consider the popular
substitutes for Aspirin3 5 as an analgesic - Disprin, Crocin and Metacin. Disprin
was initially a brand name for a generic version of Aspirin but the chemical composition of the drug sold as Disprin was later changed to paracetamol in India,
leading to potentially fatal mistakes in prescriptions.3 6 Similarly Crocin and
37
Metacin sound so very much like Aspirin, but are, in fact, similar to Calpol.
The use of Crocin and Calpol, different trade names and marks for the same
drug, paracetamol, by one company, GlaxoSmithKline ("GSK") in this case, creates significant confusion for doctors, patients, and chemists.38 For those cardiac
3

14

Bhattacharjea and Sindhwani, supra note 10, at 17. See also, Evaluate Pharma World Preview
2014 Outlook to 2020, EVALUATE GROUP (June 1, 2014), available at info.evaluategroup.com/rs/
evaluatepharmaltd/images/EP240614.pdf, on the projected market share of pharmaceutical companies in the global oncology market, the fastest growing of all therapies. Roche had a market
share in 2013 of 34.3%, followed by Novartis with 10.8% and the top 10 companies had a market
share of almost 78%.
See Jonathan Silver, Drugs for Macular Degeneration, Price Discrimination, and Medicare's
Responsibility Not to Overpay, (May 23, 2014).

Aspirin is also used to treat coronary thrombosis for which clopidogrel is a possible substitute.
See Increasing the Knowledge & Understanding of Aspirin, ASPIRIN FOUNDATION, available at
http://www.aspirin-foundation.com.
36 See Priya Yadav, Disprin isno Longer Disprin, TIMEs OF INDIA (September 12, 2001), available at
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/Disprin-is-no-longer-disprin/articleshow/1020224953.cms.
There are more than 630 brands of paracetamol (with significant price difference) made by over
300 pharmaceutical companies in India. For a listing, see www.drugsupdate.com.
This continues to occur despite the clear direction from the Supreme Court in Cadila Health
Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 73, establishing the standard for
approval of drugs and their trade names pursuant to Section 17-B of the Drugs and Cosmetics
Act, 1940. According to the decision: "Exacting judicial scrutiny is required if there isa possibility of confusion over marks on medicinal products because the potential harm may be far
more dire than that in confusion over ordinaryconsumer products."
38 There is also a brand called Krocetamol, presumably a take on both Crocin and paracetamol and

several variations on the Calpol brand - Calpol Plus which has paracetamol and ibuprofen, and
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patients who were taking a daily dose of Aspirin in the name of Dispirin, the
change to paracetamol could be fatal. Branding allows pharmaceutical companies to create a segmentation of the market for analgesics, beyond paracetamol
- a smaller market than analgesics 9 - and justify the claim that they each have
no significant market power in the analgesics market 4 when in fact, it may well
be true that each brand is a market by itself since it does not, due to the nature
of prescription, have substitutes. This allows each brand to behave independently
of the others even though, by all scientific measures, they are identical. This is
explained by the manner in which drugs are consumed and choices made. A vast
majority of drugs are bought by patients or their families on the basis of doctors' prescriptions or pharmacists' recommending specific brands 41 . "Much of the
actual demand [for drugs] arisesfrom the prescribingbehaviour of doctors, and
firms' marketing activities are geared to influencing them not just by advertising and publicity, but also through means that many would regard as unethical,
such as paying for their conferences, travel and other expenses '"42. This practice,
although illegal 43, continues to exist. The situation in India is especially serious
due to greater lack of awareness, information and education amongst consumers,
the limited coverage of health insurance, the relative absence of large, well-informed and cost-conscious institutional purchasers (whether public or private)
who can exercise countervailing power against suppliers, and weaknesses in the
regulatory framework. On the supply side, the pharmaceutical industry worldwide
is dominated by a handful of firms, with their market dominance reinforced by
Calpol T which has paracetamol with tramadol. These combinations are one of the reasons cited
by Indian doctors to prescribe brands rather than generic chemical names. See K.K. Aggarwal,
The Generic Drug Controversy, 23(9) INDIAN JOURNAL OF CLINICAL PRACTICE, 485 (February 9,
2013).
39 While it may seem like the relevant market is either analgesics or paracetamol in India, there are
other aspects like price and substitutability that affect the definition of relevant market.
40 It is arguable, based on doctors', pharmacists' and patients' views on substitutability, that combinations containing paracetamol, ibuprofen and diclofenac for example may be treated as
being part of the analgesics market, although this conclusion is not supported by the order of
the Competition Commission of India in the matter of the Sun - Ranbaxy merger, supra note
26, where for example, atorvastatin and rosuvastatin were each considered as separate markets
although the family of statins all treat the same condition and act in a similar manner and are
similarly priced by Sun. Interestingly, the Competition Commission considered spare parts for
each car brand as a relevant market in Shamsher Kataria, In re, 2014 SCC OnLine CCI 95, available at http://www.cci.gov.in/May2011/OrderOfCommissionl27/032011.pdf.
41 In violation of guidelines requiring doctors to prescribe the International Non-proprietary Name
of the drug and not brands. See Indian Medical Council (Profession Conduct, Etiquette and
Ethics) Regulations, 2002, Gazette of India, at 1.5 (April 6, 2002). For a summary of the viewpoints of the various players in the Indian healthcare sector on competition between brands, see,
Aggarwal, supra note 38.
42 Bhattacharjea and Sindhwani, supra note 10, at 26.
41 Indian Medical Council (Professional Conduct, Etiquette and Ethics) Regulations, 2002.
Regulation 6 prohibits doctors from accepting gifts. Often, to overcome this stipulation, 'free
samples' or 'special schemes' are provided to doctors by pharmaceutical companies. An example
of a 'special scheme' would be giving a doctor 5 free units for every one unit of a drug purchased. The doctor would therefore be able to sell 6 units at the retail price and make an astonishing profit without the patient ever knowing this.
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patent protection (whose scope they continually try to enlarge), mega-mergers,
large advertising and marketing budgets directed at the healthcare providers who
actually influence consumer 'choice 44.
Is there therefore a case to argue that each brand, being independent of its
chemical substitutes, is relevant in itself and therefore vulnerable to the test of
abuse of dominance?
IV. TRADE MARKS AND TRADE DRESS:
EXTENSION OF PATENT MONOPOLIES
While patents have been devised to create incentives for innovations and R &
D, its very design creates "market power positions that can adversely affect the
economic performance of the system". 45 The traditional view held by economists
that patents and other such arrangements are a way of rewarding the successful
innovators and, therefore, such measures are a kind of necessary evil one has to
put up with despite their market-distorting characteristics has now been repeatedly questioned.

46

When combined with an unlimited life of a brand protected by a trademark
or trade dress, the patent monopoly which is limited to 20 years could extend to
perpetuity. Take for example, an inhaler which is purple in colour 7 and is protected as trade dress or a blue rhomboid shaped pill. It will be virtually impossible for competitors who wish to enter the market after the expiry of the patent
term to introduce a product that looks the same. As a result, patients who have
been used to taking the purple inhaler will resist any change to a competing
product which has another colour. Similarly, patients who have been taking a blue
rhomboid shaped pill will resist changing over to another coloured or shaped pill.
This phenomenon has been recognised in recent studies and acknowledged by the
USFDA as a significant issue 48 . As a result, a patented drug which is branded or
otherwise protected by trade dress creates barriers to entry for generics at the end
"1

Bhattacharjea and Sindhwani, supra note 10, at 8.

Langinier, Corinne and Moschini, The Economics of Patents: An Overview, Working Paper
02-WP 293, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University (2002).
46 See Tirole, J., The Theory of Industrial Organisation, (MIT Press, 1995) ; Cohen et al, R&D
spillovers, patents and the incentives to innovate in Japan and the United States, 31(9) RESEARCH
POLICY, 1349-1367 (December 2002).
15

GSK has attempted this, with mixed results, in Europe.
Aaron S. Kesselheim, et al, Variations in Pill Appearance of Antiepileptic Drugs and
the Risk of Nonadherence, 173 (3) JAMA INTERNAL MEDICINE, 202 (February 11, 2013); Brady

48 See

Dennis, If Color or Shape of Generic Pills Changes, Patients May Stop Taking Them, THE
WASHINGTON POST, (July 14, 2014), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/

health- science/if- color-or- shape-changes-patients-more-likely-to -stop-taking-much-neededdrugs/2014/07/14/60e687f4-Obgc-11e4-8341-b8072ble7348 story.html. See also U.S. FederalDrug
Administration, Guidance For Industry Size, Shape, And Other Physical Attributes Of Generic
Tablets And Capsules (December 2013), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guid-

ancecomplianceregulatoryinformationguidances/ucm377938.pdf.
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of the patent monopoly period to the detriment of the market. If one applies the
rationale in Actavis, trade mark and trade dress protection should not be allowed
beyond the term of the patent. This issue becomes critical when generic competitors are not allowed to state that their products are the equivalent of the innovator
product 49 when that has been scientifically established to the satisfaction of the
drug regulator and is a regulatory requirement for the drug to be approved for
sale in India.
V. COPYRIGHT AS A BARRIER TO COMPETITION
In a recent case5", a drug5' which was first in the market tried to create barriers for competition on the basis that its competitors were using the goodwill of
the brand that it had created and established globally. This argument was successful before the Delhi High Court, much to the disappointment of health activists
and doctors. The court seems to have misunderstood the Indian drug regulatory
process which requires generics to establish equivalence with the earlier drug.
Having established that, the requirement of copyright law that they cannot use
the text of the packaging to describe the drug, its side effects, etc., seems to
defeat the whole purpose of establishing that all the competing products are substitutes. If one is allowed to insist that the text on the packaging and the "insert"
containing important information about the drug is protected by copyright, it will
result in substitutable products having different texts and could result in confusing doctors and pharmacists who may think of these products as different.
Different text implies different products and hence, a misleading effect. The
decision in Roche v. Biocon & Mlylan is wrong since it is true that generics are
bioequivalent of the Roche product which is not patented. The decision causes
segmentation of market and the Roche product is therefore a dominant monopoly
for the therapy which should be forced to promote market access by referencing
which is a regulatory requirement and has been sanctioned by the drug regulator.
If herceptin is not a brand but trastuzumab is used, market access is assured and
confusion in the market will be eliminated.
VI. POSSIBLE SOLUTION
A possible solution would be to allow competitors to use the same trade dress
and trade mark of the patented drug at the end of the patent term along with a
clear indication of the manufacturer so that there is no confusion regarding
the source of the product, the primary reason for a trade mark. So, for example, everyone who needed acetylsalicylic acid would be able to buy aspirin
49 As a result of the injunction granted by the Delhi High Court in Roche v. Mylan & Biocon
(2014).
0 Roche v. Drugs Controller, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 2358.
51 It is very interesting that there was no patent for the drug trastuzumab, sold as Herceptin.

NATIONAL LAW SCHOOL OF INDIA REVIEW

27 NLSI REv. (2015)

manufactured by a variety of drug companies, all of whom could use the name
'Aspirin'. Each of them will however have to identify themselves clearly. This
would eliminate the various brands trying to be substitutes to the 'Aspirin' brand.
Another consequence of the brand being available to all producers of Aspirin will
be severing the nexus between drug companies and doctors.5 2 Even if doctors
prescribe a brand, they will have no control over the product actually dispensed
to the patient and there will therefore be a level playing field for drug companies
to compete fairly.
VII. HOSPITALS' IN-HOUSE PHARMACIES
- ABUSE OF DOMINANCE
It seems to be a common practice that hospitals choose to stock only certain
drugs in their in-house pharmacies and insist that hospitalised patients buy drugs
only from the hospital pharmacy. Drug companies sell drugs to hospitals at a
price much lower than what the patient is charged, further incentivising the hospital to stock their products. This is further exacerbated by hospital chains promoting brands that they own. As a result, cheaper and other competing brands
often get left out in this game 53 and do not have access to the hospital patient
market. If the rationale in Hiranandaniis applied to this scenario, every hospital must treat all competing products fairly and allow patients full choice of
products.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Healthcare is too important a sector of the economy to be neglected by government. On the other hand, bad policy choices like price control of generics have hurt the industry and not benefited patients 54. While there has been a
decline of the 'License Raj' in India since the early 1990s, the government can
and should intervene in other ways so that the market forces work as they should.
So, rather than having price control for generics, competition law ought to be
enforced to ensure that there is a vibrant market by addressing demand and supply side issues for each product. In addition, direct intervention by having public
sector pharma undertakings manufacture essential drugs should be considered.
For drugs, where there is patent, the government could use public sector undertakings to manufacture these drugs under the "government non- commercial use"
flexibility in TRIPS 55 and provide patients a choice between the patented drug
manufactured by a private sector company and a cheaper alternative. To ensure
52
51
54
55

It is fairly common in Europe for generics to add their name to the INN used by the patent
holder.
See Sanjay Nagral, The Cost of Drugs: Beyond the Supreme Court Order, 48(17) ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL WEEKLY, 13 (2013).
Supra note 7.
Implemented by Section 84 of the Patents Act, 1970.
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that the poor patients are able to buy these affordable government manufactured
drugs, they should be able to debit the universal health insurance programme for
the cost of these drugs. The creation of competition on the supply side as well as
creating demand will go a long way in making healthcare affordable and accessible. Similarly, centralised procurement of drugs by all government, public sector,
railways, ESI and other entities where government provides benefit will create a
significant counter force to monopolies. The government should tender for both
generic drugs and also for licensed manufacture of patented drugs. This will
not only ensure that there is competition for all products but could well result
in technology transfer, a promise on which India and other developing countries
agreed to in the provisions of the TRIPS agreement.
All of these suggestions can be implemented easily without any legislative
changes but none of this can happen unless there is sufficient data, an understanding of the healthcare sector and the various 'relevant markets' and a commitment to data-driven, rather than ideology-led, policy making.

